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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal tax law allows the owner of a “certified historic structure” to claim a 
deduction for the charitable donation of a preservation easement.1  Oftentimes, the owner 
will also be able to claim a similar deduction from state income taxes.2  Further still, the 
donation might also lead to lower property taxes if the municipality consents to re-
appraise the property at a lower value as a result of the easement.3  Thus, the intersection 
of state and federal law may create a “tax trifecta,” which serves as a powerful economic 
incentive for property owners to donate preservation easements. 
This paper seeks to answer, from the vantage point of local historic preservation, 
whether § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code creates any benefits other than those 
enjoyed by historic property owners in the form of income tax deductions.  In other 
words, what does an easement do that local preservation laws do not already do? 
The paper concludes that historic property owners do typically relinquish 
something of value when they donate an easement and that preservation easements can be 
an effective tool to complement existing local regulation primarily because they 
withstand potential change in local laws.4  However, this paper further finds that because 
the value of a donated easement may not be as great as is commonly believed, so too may 
the future efficacy of this preservation tool be weaker than currently imagined.  
                                                 
1 I.R.C. § 170(h) (2004).  See infra  Part II and note 20.  Furthermore, the Code uses the term “qualified 
conservation contribution” rather than “preservation easement.” However, I use the latter term in this paper 
to refer to a subset of “contributions”—those easements on historic properties, as opposed to, for example, 
open-space easements that apply to property such as farmland. 
2 See e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 42-204 (2004). 
3 In Washington, D.C., while it is theoretically possible to get encumbered property re-assessed for local 
property tax purposes, it is very rare if not unprecedented.  Telephone Interview with Philip Appelbaum, 
Senior Assessor, D.C. Real Property Tax Administration (April 6, 2004). 
4 See, e.g., Robert Strauss, Official in Philly Targets Preservation Controls, WASH. POST , Mar. 22, 2004, at 
A3 (reporting on a City Council bill that would allow the Council to de-designate historic districts).  For a 
partisan account of how the small town of Monterey, Virginia abolished its historic district, see L.M. 
Schwartz, “Precedent-Setting Victory for Property Rights: Local Historic District Abolished,” at 
http://www.prfamerica.org/HistoricDistrictAbolished.html  (last visited May 10, 2004). 
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There are at least two main ways that legislation can serve the goals of historic 
preservation: local regulation of the ilk approved in Penn Central,5 and tax expenditures 
that incentivize historic preservation efforts.6 Each method reflects a different conception 
of property.  The former conceives of property as interconnected and a non-commodity 
for the purposes of protecting the “commons.”7  The latter instead conceives of property 
interests that can be severed and valued as a commodity. 8   
The purpose of distinguishing between these two conceptions of property, as 
reflected in local regulation and in the § 170(h) tax expenditure, is twofold.  First, 
hopefully it helps to situate this provision of the Revenue Code in the context of historic 
preservation methods.9  Second, it highlights the consequences of characterizing a stick 
from the property bundle, such as an easement, as a commodity. 
Penn Central established that historic properties could be landmarked, subject to 
regulation, without violating the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.10  That case, and 
regulation of property in historic districts more generally,11 can be understood as 
                                                 
5 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
6 I.R.C. § 170(h) (2004); I.R.C. § 47 (2004).  For more on the term “tax expenditure,” see STANLEY S. 
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM : THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6-7 (1973). 
7 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).  I use the term 
“commons” here to refer not to pasture for cattle to graze, but to that portion of a community’s architecture 
that it deems worth preserving.  There exists the same potential for a “tragedy of the commons” because it 
may be very beneficial for the property owner to add additional stories to a building while the negative 
effects on the historic quality of a neighborhood will be diffused among others in the community. 
8 See MORTON HORWITZ, The Progressive Transformation in the Conception of Property, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY,” 145, 149 (1992). 
9 The easement movement was born prior to Penn Central and at a time when local preservation ordinances 
were less firmly entrenched.  For a detailed account of the legislative history of § 170(h), see Stephen J. 
Small, The Tax Treatment of the Donation of Easements in Scenic and Historic Property, Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Mar. 1979); STEPHEN SMALL, THE FEDERAL TAX LAW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (2d ed. 1990 & 
Supp. 1996). 
10 438 U.S. at 138. 
11 See, e.g., Maher v. New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding validity of New Orleans 
historic preservation ordinance as legitimate exercise of police power). 
 3 
expressing a non-commodity view of property in which an individual’s property rights 
may be restricted for the sake of protecting the commons.12  
In contrast, the preservation easement deduction contained in § 170(h) persists in 
treating as a commodity those property rights that extend beyond the current reach of 
local regulation.  If one conceives of the easement as going beyond what a community 
has collectively decided is required for the sake of the commons, then it makes normative 
sense to focus on the individual “stick” from the property bundle to arrive at a value of 
compensation in the form of an income tax deduction.  In contrast to Penn Central, where 
the owner received no compensation because it was one of many subject to a 
comprehensive plan, the owner who donates an easement does receive compensation for 
going beyond what the comprehensive plan requires.  For § 170(h) to maintain its 
sensible normativeness, however, it is important that an easement actually reflect a 
donation that is beneficial to the commons.13  
To understand how the conceptions of property are contextually dependent on a 
community’s regulation of its commons, consider hypothetical owners X and Y.  Each 
owns an historic property, but X lives in a “weak” historic district, while Y lives in a 
“strong” historic district.  X might be able to successfully deduct the value of the donated 
easement that imposes more stringent controls than those in his district’s ordinances, 
even if the easement’s burdens are no stronger than the ordinances in Y’s district.  Much 
to the consternation of Y, were he to donate the same easement that X imposed, he should 
clearly receive no deduction because he has not experienced a further burden.  In other 
                                                 
12 See Joseph Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81YALE L.J. 149, 162 (1972) (“The effects 
of a vast tower built on a single tract spill over visually onto other lands just as smoke or noise does.”). 
13 Although the donation of an easement entails a particularized analysis of an individual property right, the 
deduction is nonetheless “community-based” because it involves the expenditure of public funds. 
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words, the “stick” that X donates is no longer a stick for Y because of the more 
demanding baseline that Y’s district has drawn to protect its commons.14 
Because this outer, or unregulated, realm of property interests is treated by the 
Code as a commodity, an owner is likely to donate it only when it is in his economic 
interest.  If the value of some easements may not be as great as is commonly believed, as 
this paper posits, property owners, assuming they are self- interested and not altruistic 
preservationists, are more likely to retain non-regulated property interests than they 
would be were the easements valued as high as is now commonly believed. 
Therefore, § 170(h) is a historic preservation tool that complements local 
regulation because it, for example, encourages the use of easements that last in perpetuity 
whereas local regulations may change.  However, the efficacy of § 170(h) is proportional 
to the value ascribed to easements.  Should the value of easements be lower than 
currently imagined, owners will be less likely to take this additional step that would be 
beneficial to the commons.  
 
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEMA 
 Only qualified conservation contributions are eligible for deductions.15  For the 
purposes of historic structures, there needs to be (1) a qualified real property interest, (2) 
donated to a qualified organization, (3) exclusively for conservation purposes.16   
                                                 
14 For a lucid discussion of the significance of forms of property, see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1534-35 (2003) (“To know if and how the existing configuration of a property 
form should affect the legal outcome, however, we must analyze the forms of property from a normative 
and contextual (i.e., legal realist) perspective.  The forms of property should affect outcomes to the extent 
that they help constitute property institutions that serve important human values.”). 
15 I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2004). 
16 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A -14 (as amended in 1999). 
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First, a preservation easement counts as a “qualified real property interest” if it is 
“a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real 
property.”17 Second, qualified organizations are typically § 501(c)(3) organizations but 
might instead be a state or a subdivision of a state.18 Third, a donor will meet the 
“exclusively for conservation purposes” test if the donation is for the “preservation of an 
historically important land area or a certified historic structure” and is protected in 
perpetuity. 19  
Further to the third requirement, a certified historic structure is a structure that is 
“listed in the National Register” or that is “located in a registered historic district…and is 
certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary [of the Treasury] as being of 
historic significance to the district.”20 The Treasury Regulations impose an additional 
requirement that there be “some visual public access to the donated property.”21 Most 
properties in an urban environment, such as Washington, D.C. or New Orleans, meet this 
requirement because the property is visible from a public way.  With respect to the 
“exclusively” requirement, the Treasury Regulations impose another important 
requirement: a mortgagee must subordinate its rights in the property “to the right of the 
qualified organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.”22 
                                                 
17 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2004). 
18 I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (2004). See also  Treas. Reg. § 1.170A -14(c) (as amended in 1999) (requiring that 
organization have resources to enforce easement, but stating that the organization need not set aside funds 
to enforce the easement). 
19 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) (2004); I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2004). 
20 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(B) (2004).  For the definition of “registered historic district,” see I.R.C. § 47(c)(3)(B) 
(2004). See also  Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(ii)(B) (as amended in 1999) (noting that “historically 
important land areas” include those buildings in a historic district that “can reasonably be considered as 
contributing to the significance of the district”).  
21 Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(d)(5)(iv) (as amended in 1999). 
22 Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(g)(2) (as amended in 1999).  See also  Satullo v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697 
(1993) (holding that donated easement was not a “qualified conservation contribution” because 
mortgagee’s interest was superior to the easement holder’s, who failed to have mortgagee subordinate its 
rights.) 
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Although the Revenue Code allows for the deduction of a charitably donated 
easement, it provides no guidance on how to properly value a preservation easement.  
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings clarify that the value of a preservation 
easement is its fair market value; however, because there is no real market for easements, 
the fair market value is derived by subtracting the value of the encumbered property after 
imposing the easement from the value of the property prior to imposing the easement.23   
 There are three main approaches to conducting the “before and after” valuation of 
an easement: (1) comparable sales, (2) capitalized net operating income, and (3) 
replacement cost.24  The replacement cost method is often a poor method for determining 
the value of historic properties, so appraisers tend to rely on the first two methods.25  
Furthermore, the income approach typically does not apply well to residential property, 
which often leaves the comparable sales method the most appropriate method for 
conducting the before and after valuation of residential property. 26 
Whichever method is applied, the two most basic steps in the valuation process 
are determining the “highest and best use” of the property (1) before the easement is 
imposed and (2) after the easement is imposed.27  For a property owner to establish that 
                                                 
23 Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(h)(3) (as amended in 1999) (Stating that “the fair market value of a perpetual 
conservation restriction is equal to the difference between the fair market value of the property it 
encumbers before the granting of the restriction and the fair market value of the encumbered property after 
the granting of the restriction.”); Rev. Rul. 73-339. 
24 LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, APPRAISING EASEMENTS, GUIDELINES FOR VALUATION OF LAND 
CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENTS 30-33 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter APPRAISING 
EASEMENTS].  Treasury Regulations call only for the before and after valuation method; these three specific 
methods are those accepted by and used in the appraisal profession. 
25 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH), 600 (1990) (rejecting cost approach because 
reproduction or replacement of a historic property was too remote a possibility to provide a value); Losch 
v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH), 915 (1988) (“However, in dealing with an older, historic structure, it is 
highly questionable whether the replacement cost method can be used to provide meaningful results.”). 
26 APPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra  note 24, at 30. 
27 Hilborn, 85 T.C. at 689.  For a visual aid, see Appendix A. 
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there is a use higher and better than the current use, the owner must show such use is 
reasonably probable in the near future.28   
Key to understanding whether an easement’s burden is greater than that already 
imposed by local law is the requirement that local zoning and preservation laws be 
considered.  The Regulation calls for considering “any effect from zoning, conservation, 
or historic preservation laws that already restrict the property’s potential highest and best 
use.”29 Because an easement is a binding agreement between the property owner and the 
donee organization, the parties have flexibility in deciding the easement’s terms.  One 
example of how an easement might facially go beyond the scope of local regulations is 
for the easement to apply to all sides of the property.  Because most local preservation 
regulation applies only to what is visible from a public right-of-way, then an easement 
which applies to all sides—including those portions not visible from a public right of 
way—goes beyond local regulation.  For example, in Washington, D.C., preservation 
regulation is dramatically reduced for additions or alterations if they are done to part of 
the property, such as the rear, that is not visible from a public way. 30  In contrast, an 
easement might be imposed on all sides of an his toric building. 31  On its face then, the 
easement will exceed the regulations’ control, but ascribing a value to that difference is a 
thornier task.   
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1999); see also  S. Rep. 96-1007, 15 (“Where applicable, 
valuation of the property before contribution should take into account zoning, conservation, or historic 
preservation laws that would restrict development of the property.”).   
30 Although the Washington, D.C. statute and regulations do not expressly l imit the review of alterations or 
additions to visible portions, compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1101-1107 (2004) and D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 10, 
§ 2505-2510 (2004) with the Historic Preservation Design Guidelines, promulgated by the Historic 
Preservation Review Board, entitled “Additions to Historic Buildings,” 8, 11 available at  
http://planning.dc.gov/planning/frames.asp?doc=/planning/LIB/planning/preservation/pdf/000015b4.pdf 
(last visited May 10, 2004).  It is unusual for a municipality to have control over “all four walls.” 
31 See, e.g., the easements of L’Enfant Trust, available at  http://www.lenfant.org/2004deed.doc (April, 
2004), and Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown, available at 
http://preservegeorgetown.org/document.htm (2004). 
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III. WHAT THE OWNER GIVES UP: ACCOUNTING FOR LOCAL LAW 
Do property-owners in historic districts give up anything when they donate 
preservation easements, or, given that these owners already face local preservation and 
zoning ordinances, is the donation an empty, tax-motivated gesture?  The approximately 
six cases on point establish that, notwithstanding local preservation laws, these owners do 
give up something additional—for example, the right to higher rental income or the right 
to make additions that would have otherwise been approved.32  A review of the caselaw is 
helpful to understanding what owners give up but also highlights concerns that the typical 
value of a donated easement may not be as great as is commonly believed.33 As a result, a 
lower value for easements may weaken this alternative method of historic preservation.  
As a result of imposing a preservation easement, the property owners in each of 
the six cases experience a diminution in property value ranging from ten to twenty 
percent.  All of these cases concern the proper valuation of the easement donated.  Within 
this small body of case law, four cases—Hilborn, Losch, Nicoladis, and Dorsey—are 
helpful in parceling out what portion of the diminution is attributable to an easement that 
does more than local regulations.  Due to a dearth of analysis, the remaining two cases, 
Richmond and Griffin, do not clearly articulate how the easement in question went 
beyond local law but nonetheless comprise part of IRS precedent of relying on a ten 
percent diminution factor. 
 
                                                 
32 See Richmond v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 578 (D. La. 1988); Dorsey v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 
592 (1990); Griffin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1560 (1989); Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909 
(1988); Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 624 (1988); Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 667 (1985); see 
also  Granger v. Comm’r, No. 87-2455-0 (D.C. Kan. 1988) (not discussed here because this case is not 
illustrative of the impact of local preservation laws; the case instead focused on the issue of whether 
taxpayers could recover litigation costs from the government, which the court held took a stance that was 
not “substantially justified.”). 
33 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Hilborn v. Commissioner 
Hilborn is the first case involving an easement on a historic property and is 
significant for at least two reasons.  First, the opinion articulates how the extra financial 
burdens incurred in donating the easement at issue went beyond local ordinances.  
Second, as discussed below in Part IV, the case appears to be the origin of confusion that 
there is something akin to a rule or a guaranteed factor of diminution. 34 
The taxpayers were members of a partnership that acquired an office building in 
New Orleans’ Vieux Carre historic district.35  At issue in the case was not whether the 
easement qualified under § 170(h), but what the value of the deduction should be.  In the 
Tax Court’s findings of fact, it noted that the Vieux Carre Commission’s “Façade 
Easement Policy” was to apply a higher standard than what was already required of 
buildings in the district; in some cases, this standard required those seeking to donate an 
easement to first restore the property. 36  Indeed, the Commission made acceptance of the 
donation conditional on expending $185,000, exclusive of façade repairs, to renovate the 
building. 37  The partnership then entered into an easement agreement that required it to 
spend an additional $47,800 to renovate the exterior façade.38  The court agreed with the 
taxpayers’ expert that the easement imposed “‘substantial additional burdens’” beyond 
the existing zoning laws and the Commission’s requirements because the easement 
required rehabilitation and also prevented a higher and better use of the property 
                                                 
34 See APPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra  note 24, at 10 (“The decision has served as a valuation benchmark 
for subsequent historic preservation easement valuation cases, which generally recognized a 12 percent to 
15 percent valuation differential attributable to easements.”). 
35 85 T.C. at 677. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 680. 
38 Id. 
 10 
attainable but for the easement’s restriction on assembling the property with a corner 
lot.39   
However, although the court agreed with the taxpayers’ appraiser that the 
easement created burdens more substantial than the IRS appraiser found, it nonetheless 
held that those burdens were adequately reflected in the IRS appraiser’s finding of a ten 
percent diminution in value.40  The taxpayers’ appraiser told the court that his twelve 
percent diminution factor was wholly subjective, while the court found that the IRS 
appraiser used an objective methodology. 41 
 
Losch v. Commissioner 
Losch marked a continuation of the IRS reliance on a ten percent diminution 
factor but is helpful because the opinion includes a description of how the easement, 
which extended to the interior of the property, was more stringent than local law.  Losch 
is also significant because of the court’s comments on its institutional capacity to decide 
valuation disputes.42 
Losch centered on the valuation of an easement that the Losch couple had 
imposed on property located in Washington, D.C.’s Dupont Circle historic district.43 The 
easement donated was somewhat unique in that it also contained restrictions on what 
                                                 
39 Id. at 691. 
40 Id. at 698. 
41 Id. at 699. 
42 Losch, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 921 (1988) (“At this point we feel constrained to reiterate once again our 
doubts as to the efficacy of using the judicial process to resolve valuation issues… Additionally, we believe 
that resolution of theses issues by settlement or other procedures short of court proceedings will often result 
in a value which is fairer to both parties.  The parties and their experts will generally have a fuller 
knowledge of the pertinent facts and greater expertise than does this Court which must rely only on ‘a cold 
record and dry briefs’ to from the basis of its conclusion.”) 
43 55 T.C.M. at 910. 
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could be done to the interior of the property; 44 with respect to control of the interior, then, 
it clearly restricted more than local preservation ordinances.  The taxpayers’ appraiser 
concluded that part of the decline in value stemmed from a $25,000 loss of the right to 
develop the property to the extent of zoning regulations and a $10,000 loss in any 
potential opportunity that would become available in the future because of changes in 
future zoning laws.45 
The taxpayers presented testimony from a former zoning board official and 
Historic Preservation Review Board official that an additional two floors of residential 
space would probably have been approved under existing regulations.46  Nonetheless, the 
court found that the $25,000 portion of the loss was too speculative because, although the 
taxpayers did account for existing regulations in calculating the before and after value of 
the property, they did not offer any evidence of the economic feasibility of a two-floor 
addition project.47  In other words, the addition could not be considered the property’s 
“highest and best use” because the possibility of such a project was too remote.48  
In rejecting the $10,000 diminution attributed to potential future changes in local 
law, the court did nothing more than to say that the figure was too speculative.  The 
rejection of that figure, however, is significant because it demonstrates that however 
sound the policy argument may be for encouraging perpetual easements on top of 
potentially unstable local law, there is no authority suggesting that potential future 
change in local laws is to be included in valuation. 49 In other words, while the 
                                                 
44 Id. at 912. 
45 Id. at 914. 
46 Id. at 915. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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Regulations require that the easement be compared with local ordinances during the 
valuation process, the comparison is for the purpose of determining whether the easement 
imposes any additional restrictions on reasonably likely uses of the property—not for 
ascribing an additional value for the easement’s quality of being perpetual.     
When conducting the “comparable sales” analysis to determine the easement’s 
value, the taxpayers’ appraiser unsurprisingly found that the imposition of an easement 
did cause a noticeable diminution in value while the IRS appraiser’s comparable sales 
analysis was inconclusive.50  Nonetheless, the IRS stayed close to the ten percent figure 
used in Hilborn because, despite the inconclusiveness of the comparable sales analysis, 
the IRS appraiser found a ten percent diminution reasonable.51  However, the court opted 
to find a fifteen-percent diminution, through the comparable sales approach, because of 
one particular comparable sale, also on New Hampshire Avenue, that supported a fifteen- 
to twenty-two-percent diminution. 52  Although the comparable sales analysis did support 
finding a diminution in value, this method of analysis did not articulate what the owner 
gave up as clearly as did the income capitalization method. 
The IRS appraiser’s income capitalization analys is showed that, as a result of the 
easement, the owners lost rental value due to the inability to install an elevator as a result 
of the interior easement and increased insurance and reserve costs.53  The court averaged 
its own findings on the “comparable sales” ($116,250) and income capitalization 
($143,000) methods and concluded that the easement’s value was $130,000;54 given the 
                                                 
50 Id. at 918. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 921. 
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court’s finding that the “before” value of the property was $775,000, the taxpayers ended 
up with a property value diminished by roughly seventeen percent. 
Although the current use of the building was also the highest and best use, the 
taxpayers in Losch nonetheless secured a substantial deduction because of the atypical 
easement that extended to the interior, the favorable comparable sales analysis, and the 
even more favorable income capitalization analysis.  Sixteen years after Losch, a 
comparison of a more typical easement donation suggests that the likely diminution in 
value may often be below that won in Losch.  Most easements do not grant the easement 
holder control over a property’s interior and are therefore not likely to be as restrictive as 
the easement in Losch.   
Furthermore, because the income capitalization method of valuation does not 
apply to residential property, the comparable sales analysis is the favored method of 
valuation.  As discussed in Part IV, there is a substantial and growing body of easements 
in several areas that should make the comparable sales analysis more conclusive than it 
has been in the past.55 Given that residential property owners generally have one leg to 
stand on (comparable sales analysis), then such owners would deduct lower amounts or 
nothing at all if comparable sales analyses show that the easements have minimal to no 
impact on property value.     
                                                 
55 At the time of this writing, there were approximately 901 easements recorded in Washington, D.C. 
(L’Enfant Trust holds 697, Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown holds 98, National 
Trust holds 14, Preservation Trust holds 82, Tri-State Architectural Trust holds 10). E-mail from Carol 
Go ldman, President, L’Enfant Trust (March 31, 2004, 12:15 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Peter 
Jost, Trustee, Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown (March 31, 2004, 10:02 EST) (on 
file with author); E-mail from Paul Edmondson, General Counsel, National Trust (April 1, 2004, 2:27 EST) 
(on file with author); E-mail from Ray Gooch, Preservation Trust (April 1, 2004, 3:04 EST) (on file with 
author); Telephone Interview with Karen Leonel, Tri-State Architectural Trust (April 5, 2004). See also  
APPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra  note 24, at 9 (“Since Appraising Easements was first released in 1984, a 
number of easement-encumbered properties have sold or been transferred. In areas with significant 
conservation easement sales data, careful appraisers incorporate such data into their appraisals, even if the 
data are not sufficient to permit complete reliance on a comparable sales analysis.”). 
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Nicoladis v. Commissioner 
Nicoladis is yet another instance of reliance on a ten percent diminution factor—
both by the IRS appraiser and the taxpayers’ appraiser.  As in Losch, the court showed its 
institutional reluctance to quibble with the ten percent figure that both sides relied upon 
for part of the valuation. 56 
The taxpayers were members of a Louisiana partnership.57  The property at issue 
consisted of a two-and-one-half story building with attached, vacant lots.58 Interestingly, 
with respect to the building itself, both parties stuck to the ten percent figure used in 
Hilborn.59 The taxpayers took note of the Hilborn decision when they requested that their 
appraiser conduct a second appraisal in light of that decision.60  
The parties diverged most clearly in their arguments regarding the difference 
between the easement and the regulations that already applied to the property. 61 The 
taxpayers argued that, after donating the easement, the highest and best use of the vacant 
portion was as a parking lot because it had forsaken the ability to develop that lot.62  In 
contrast, the IRS appraiser argued that the taxpayer could not have developed that lot 
even before donating the easement because the public was likely to object to such 
development.63  The taxpayer won on this point because the court found that the IRS 
expert only speculated about opposition while the taxpayer presented testimony from a 
                                                 
56 55 T.C.M. at 629 (“For lack of evidence to the contrary, we accept this figure.  We will not impose our 
judgment on the issue without sufficient reason to doubt the experts and evidence upon which to base our 
opinion.”)  See discussion infra Part IV.   
57 Id. at 628. 
58 Id. at 624-25. 
59 Id. at 627. 
60 Id. at 626. 
61 Id. at 627. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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Historic District Landmark Commission representative that, prior to the easement, some 
development was possible.64  Finally, the taxpayer won an approximately fourteen-
percent reduction because the IRS conceded that, with respect to the adjacent vacant lot, 
there was some loss of development rights beyond the ten percent reduction. 65 
There were two main factors contributing to the taxpayers’ success in obtaining a 
fourteen percent deduction.  First, the court was unwilling to look beyond the ten percent 
figure upon which both sides relied.  Second, the taxpayers presented testimony, rather 
than speculation, that they had given up some development potential on the adjacent lot.  
If taxpayers can continue to present solid evidence, such as the testimony in Nicoladis, 
that development potential has been sacrificed, then they should be able to continue 
claiming deductions.  However, as discussed below, sixteen years after Nicoladis, there 
exists the risk that a court might now have sufficient evidence to more forcefully probe 
whether reliance on a ten percent figure is justified.   
 
Richmond v. Commissioner 
Richmond, which involved facts similar to Hilborn, is less illustrative of the 
impact of local preservation laws for two main reasons. (1) The taxpayers presented 
virtually no evidence to support their argument that they deserved a twenty-five percent 
diminution in value.66 (2) The IRS appraiser, contrary to the Hilborn and Nicoladis 
insistence that valuation is a “question of facts and circumstances,” automatically granted 
a ten percent reduction and also accounted for the easement’s requirements that the 
                                                 
64 Id. at 628. 
65 Id. at 629. 
66 699 F. Supp. 578, 580-81. 
 16 
owners make extra expenditures.67  Thus, despite what appeared to be the taxpayers’ 
inability to carry their burden of proof, they still secured a fifteen-percent reduction in 
value. 
 
Griffin v. Commissioner 
Griffin also involved members of a Louisiana partnership who owned property in 
the same “Central Business District” mentioned in Nicoladis.68  The property consisted of 
three adjacent buildings, which were classified as having experienced significant façade 
changes but that nonetheless still contributed to the historic district.69  The taxpayers 
boldly argued for a fifty- three percent diminution in value, and the taxpayers’ appraiser 
erroneously argued that, after the easement, the buildings had zero value.70  The IRS and 
taxpayer did not differ much regarding the “before” value.71   
Next, the IRS appraiser took the familiar step of granting a ten percent diminution 
to the easement.72  The taxpayers argued to go beyond the ten percent factor used in 
Hilborn because that case involved property in the French Quarter, which imposed 
tougher restrictions on property than the standard applied to their category of property in 
the Central Business District; in fact, they argued that, absent the easement, they would 
be able to demolish the buildings to construct a commercial office building.73  Without 
much explanation, the court agreed that there was more development potential than in the 
                                                 
67 Id. at 584. 
68 56 T.C.M. at 1560. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1563, n.4. 
71 Id. at 1563. 
72 Id. (“The 10-percent factor was based on our opinion in Hilborn v. Commissioner….). 
73 Id. In the absence of testimony that the taxpayers would have been able to demolish the buildings, the 
court noted that “we doubt that demolition of the existing buildings and construction of a totally new office 
building would have been permitted”). 
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French Quarter and concluded that under “the totality of the evidence,” the easement 
caused a twenty percent diminution in value.74 Therefore, one half of the taxpayers’ 
deduction stemmed from the IRS concession that there was a ten percent diminution, and 
the other half of the deduction stemmed from the court’s opaque finding that regulations 
touching their property were not as strict as those imposed by the French Quarter.  In 
Losch and Nicoladis, taxpayers presented testimony that some development would have 
been allowed absent the easement.  In contrast, even if the taxpayers’ district was not as 
regulated as the French Quarter, Griffin did not clearly articulate how the taxpayers had 
sacrificed the ability to develop their property. 
 
Dorsey v. Commissioner 
Dorsey, the most recent case involving an easement valuation dispute in a historic 
district, contains a more thorough discussion of the impact of local preservation laws and 
touches similar concerns to those raised in Nicoladis.  The property involved was a three-
story building in New Orleans’ Picayune Place Historic District.75  The easement covered 
all of the exterior surfaces, obligated the owners to make the expenditures that the 
easement holder found necessary to maintain the building’s character, and prevented 
changing the use of the building regardless of whether a higher and better use was 
possible.76   
Both the taxpayer and IRS agreed that, after the easement, the highest and best 
use was as a three-story building. 77  However, the taxpayer argued that the highest and 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1564. 
75 59 T.C.M. at 594. 
76 Id. at 597. 
77 Id. at 599. 
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best “before” use was as a five-story building. 78  After applying the “income 
capitalization” method, the taxpayer argued that the value of the easement donated was 
approximately $245,000.79  The IRS argued that the highest and best use of the “before” 
building was actually the same as its current use, and then applied a ten-percent 
diminution factor to arrive at an easement value of $46,000.80 As for the highest and best 
“before” use, the court agreed with the taxpayers, who presented testimony from a 
Historic District Landmarks Commission member and a former director of the office of 
Safety and Permits that the Commission would have approved additions and set-back 
requirements probably would have been waived to add two stories to the structure.81  
However, the court then found that the taxpayer had mechanically applied the before and 
after method of valuation. 82 
Instead of following the taxpayers’ method, the court performed two steps to find 
an easement value of approximately $153,000, which represented a thirty-three percent 
diminution in value.83  First, the court found that with respect to the loss of control over 
the building’s exterior, there was no real evidence of comparable sales, and therefore it 
relied on the ten percent diminution factor, which it applied only to the building itself.84  
Second, the court arrived at the square footage of development rights that was foregone 
by the easement.85  Next, it determined the percentage of the “before” space that the lost 
                                                 
78 Id. at 597. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 598. 
81 Id. at 600. 
82 Id. at 601. 
83 Id. at 602. 
84 Id.  But see Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 699 (1985) (stating that “land value, being an integral part 
of improved real estate, cannot be factored out in determining before and after value”). 
85 Id. 
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rights represented and multiplied that factor by the property’s value.86  Upon combining 
the exterior control loss (step one) and development rights loss (step two), the court 
arrived at the figure of $153,422.87  Although the percentage diminution was actually 
greater than what the taxpayer had argued, twenty percent, the actual value was smaller 
because the taxpayer’s mechanical valuation led to a substantially higher “before” value. 
Similarly to Nicoladis, the taxpayers’ success here stemmed from two sources.  
First, because it had no comparable sales evidence, the court relied on the ten percent 
figure to determine the amount of diminution caused by the loss of control.  Second, the 
court gave weight to testimony that an additional two stories would have been permitted 
and determined that there was also diminution because of the loss of development rights.  
As discussed above in the context of Nicoladis, such testimony is undoubtedly helpful to 
showing that the easement in question goes beyond local regulation.  However, should 
comparable sales become more determinative in the future, then reliance on a ten percent 
diminution is riskier. 
 Hilborn, Losch, Nicoladis, and Dorsey each articulate what it is that property 
owners are giving up when they donate a preservation easement.  In Hilborn, it was 
documented that the easement went beyond the Vieux Carre Commission’s normal 
standards by, for example, requiring the owners to make extra expenditures and 
preventing the assemblage of the property with a corner lot.88  In Losch, it was clear that 
the interior easement went beyond local regulations and imposed a real burden. 89  In 
Nicoladis, the taxpayers presented testimony to show that they had lost some 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 85 T.C. at 680, 691. 
89 55 T.C.M. at 912. 
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development rights because of the easement.90  And in Dorsey, the taxpayers also 
successfully presented testimony that they had given up valuable development rights as a 
result of the easement.91 
 However, Richmond provides significantly less support for the conclusion that the 
easement in that case caused a fifteen percent diminution in value.  Although the case 
shared some facts with Hilborn, such as expenditures required by the Vieux Carre 
Commission, the Richmond property was already at its highest and best use prior to the 
easement, unlike in Hilborn where there was previously the potential to assemble the 
property with a corner lot.92  So while it seems that some portion of the fifteen percent is 
supported by the requisite expenditures, the re is little explanation for why the IRS 
decided to grant a fifteen percent diminution.   
Griffin also contained an unsatisfactory explanation of why the property 
warranted a twenty percent diminution, as the court concluded, or even a ten percent 
diminution, as the IRS argued.93  In these two cases, and even to some extent in cases 
such as Losch, the IRS strategy was to stick to a ten percent diminution factor.  Thus, 
while the Tax Court highlighted that it had not established a ten percent rule in Hilborn,94 
the IRS and many taxpayers nonetheless appear to have proceeded as if there were such a 
rule.95         
                                                 
90 55 T.C.M. at 628. 
91 59 T.C.M. at 600. 
92 699 F. Supp. at 583. 
93 56 T.C.M. at 1563. 
94 Nicoladis, 55 T.C.M. at 629. (“There was a fair amount of discussion by the parties at trial about whether 
the Court had established a ‘10-percent rule’ in Hilborn. We did not there and do not here. Hilborn 
establishes as acceptable the before and after method of valuation, and while under the circumstances of 
that case a 10-percent figure was relied upon, valuation itself is still a question of facts and 
circumstances.”)  
95 One easement holding organization, the National Architectural Trust, suggests that a property owner may 
receive an 11% diminution.  I entered into the Trust’s easement calculator,  available at http://www.nat-
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A POTENTIALLY REDUCED EASEMENT VALUE 
 Many easements may be overvalued when taxpayers deduct their value as 
charitable donations, and therefore there is currently too much reliance on a guaranteed 
minimum ten percent diminution.  Nonetheless, there is a laundry list of reasons why 
preservation easements are an effective historic preservation tool.  Primary among these 
reasons is that easements are perpetual, whereas local law is subject to change.   
 
Cause for Concern Regarding Reliance on a Ten Percent Figure 
There are several reasons to be concerned that the Nicoladis court was correct in 
stating that valuation remains a question of “facts and circumstances” and that there is no 
“ten percent rule.”96 Among these reasons is the lack of authority for such a rule from 
legislative history, statutory authority, or case law.  Furthermore, there has been a period 
of relative dormancy in terms of valuation litigation, and the IRS has recently redacted 
suggestions of generally appropriate diminution figures.  This dormant period and 
redaction lead one to wonder whether the IRS would proceed differently should more 
valuation litigation occur in the future.   
Beginning with the legislative history behind § 170(h), the Committee of Ways 
and Means report states that “there may be instances in which the grant of an easement 
may serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of property, and in such instances no 
deduction would be allowable; for example, where there is a premium in value on 
                                                                                                                                                 
arch-trust.org/participate (last visited May 10, 2004), that I was a 35% bracket taxpayer who owned a piece 
of property worth $1,000,000.  The calculator then informed me that an easement would be worth 
$110,000, giving me a tax savings of more than $40,000. 
96 55 T.C.M. at 629. 
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property of a historic nature.”97  The Committee noted further that it intended that “as the 
use of conservation easements increases, valuation would increasingly take into account 
the selling price value, in arm’s- length transactions, of other properties burdened with 
comparable restrictions.”98  In light of this legislative history, property owners may be 
relying on the good graces of the IRS when it comes to expecting a ten or fifteen percent 
diminution. 99  In other words, while the IRS has a track record of applying the ten percent 
factor in case law, there is no statutory, legislative history, or even case law support for 
the notion that an easement is sure to produce a ten percent diminution in value.  Should, 
as the Committee report suggests, valuation increasingly take into consideration 
comparable sales of encumbered properties, then areas such as New Orleans and 
Washington, D.C. have a substantial pool of such properties that can serve as a basis for 
comparison. 100   
Case law shows that taxpayers’ success was generally due to one of or a 
combination of three factors: (1) testimony or clear evidence that reasonably likely 
development rights had been given up; (2) appraisals more generally, typically using the 
income capitalization method, which established a diminished property value; and (3) a 
virtually automatic IRS concession of a ten percent diminution.  Although case law 
should clearly be a source for concluding that some percentage deduction follows from a 
                                                 
97 S. Rep. 96-1007; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1999) contains very similar language. 
98 S. Rep. 96-1007. 
99 See also  John Handley, Fading Ladies? Chicago’s Victorians Fighting the Odds, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 
2003 (Real Estate)  (referring to an interview with the preservation easement coordinator for the Landmarks 
Preservation Council of Illinois, “In return, they get a charitable tax deduction of 15 percent of fair market 
value of the house.”); Mary Beth Klatt, Hidden Legacy Architect Leaves Imprint on Chicago Landscape, 
CHI. TRIB., April 27, 2003 (Real Estate) (referring again to the same preservation easement coordinator, 
“homeowners receive a one-time 20 percent tax break on the home’s appraised value….”). 
100 See Supra  note 55.  But see Richard Roddewig, Preservation Easements: Current Issues (prepared for 
ALI/ABA Historic Preservation Law Program in Washington, D.C. Apr. 29-30, 2004) (In referring to 
ongoing studies of easement-encumbered properties conducted in cities such as Washington, D.C. and 
Philadelphia, the study notes that challenges such as a limited number of transactions make it difficult to 
reach a detailed conclusion on easements’ impact on property prices.). 
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showing that development rights have been sacrificed, property owners, especially 
residential property owners, should put little stock in the other two factors.  All of the 
property in the six discussed cases was commercial, and as noted above, the income 
capitalization method is generally inapplicable to residential property.  Therefore, case 
law seems to be a poor source of comfort for residential property owners—at least with 
respect to any portion of diminution owing to a conclusive appraisal.  After all, only in 
Losch did the comparable sales analysis prove fruitful. 101   
 The third factor, IRS concession of a ten percent diminution, does not provide 
stable footing either.  If comparable sales analyses become more conclusive in the future, 
then it is reasonable to expect that the IRS would not concede a ten percent diminution.  
Yet even presently, there is risk in relying on a ten percent diminution because of the 
dormancy in litigating preservation easement cases, the recent IRS redaction from 
materials available on its website of a suggested diminution range, and also because of 
courts’ institutional capacity to decide valuation cases. 
It has been over fourteen years since a case involving the valuation of a 
preservation easement was decided, and all of the six cases discussed here involved 
easements that were conveyed between the ends of 1979 and 1981, not long after it 
became clear that historic property owners could make donations of easements.   
The recurring reliance on the ten percent figure appears to stem partially from an 
IRS brief that formerly suggested that a ten to fifteen percent diminution in value was 
appropriate.  The IRS has since redacted that portion of the brief that suggested a 
                                                 
101 Losch, 55 T.C.M. at 918. 
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generally appropriate diminution percentage.102 However, it appears that some 
organizations continue to rely on the older version of the brief. 103 Confusingly enough, 
the same suggested diminution range can still be found buried in an IRS audit guide, 
although this document also appears to have been modified.104 
It seems that a portion of the taxpayers’ success was due to the courts’ 
aboveboard institutional discomfort with resolving valuation disputes.105 Where there was 
little to support a finding of diminished value, the court would nonetheless look to the 
IRS argument, which usually conceded diminution by hewing to a ten percent baseline.106 
Because the IRS conceded a ten percent diminution, and the court was unlikely to reach a 
finding more anti-taxpayer than what the IRS was arguing, the issue was then whether ten 
percent was all that the taxpayer would get or whether there was diminution greater than 
ten percent.  For future valuation cases, then, this begs the question of how the court 
would view the parties’ relative arguments if the IRS did not concede a ten percent 
diminution. 
                                                 
102 Compare Mark Primoli, Façade Easement Contributions, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/facade_easement_brief.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) with Mark Primoli, Façade Easement 
Contributions, available at http://www.preservationeasements.org/home/IRSTaxBrief.pdf (last visited May 
10, 2004) (“Internal Revenue Service Engineers have concluded that the proper valuation of a façade 
easement should range from approximately 10 percent to 15 percent of the value of the property.”).  I am 
grateful to Paul Edmondson, Vice President and General Counsel for the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, who made this keen observation to me in a conversation on March 29, 2004.  In a 
conversation with an IRS employee who would not allow his or her name to be used because the comments 
had not received clearance from the IRS, I learned that the suggested range in the Primoli article was 
redacted to avoid confusion and to better align IRS stance with I.R.C. § 170(h) and the related Treasury 
Regulations, neither of which contains a suggested valuation range. 
103 See, e.g., the Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois website, which has the ten to fifteen percent 
figure in bold font, available at http://www.landmarks.org/easement_tax.htm (last visited May 10, 2004). 
104 Compare Richard Roddewig, Preservation Easements: An Appraiser’s Primer on Tax Rules and 
Valuation Issues, October 7-8, 2002 (mentioning Chapter 18 of an Audit Manual, which stated that the 
suggested diminution range was derived from a seminar conducted by IRS engineers in Philadelphia) with 
the same chapter in the currently available audit guide, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
mssp/rehab.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004). 
105 Losch, 55 T.C.M. at 921. 
106 See, e.g., Dorsey, 59 TCM 602 (“The only evidence presented on the ‘value’ of [the loss of control over 
the building’s exterior] was an amount equal to 10 percent of the Property’s total fair market value.  We 
accept it.”). 
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Easements as an Alternative Historic Preservation Tool  
 In addition to the benefit that easements are perpetual, easements produce another 
benefit in the form of private policing when neighbors are given notice that property is 
encumbered with an easement and when easement holders enforce their easements 
against violators.107 Of somewhat smaller benefit is the fact that easements are not prone 
to attack on constitutional grounds as are ordinances.108 
As an example of easements’ staying power, consider the fate of three historic 
buildings in Charleston, South Carolina.  Historic Charleston Foundation owned interior 
easements on three properties located close to a new federal courthouse annex.  In the 
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, the General Services Administration (“GSA”) 
wanted to keep the façade of the historic buildings but replace the interior structures to 
increase security.  After a contentious period during which Charleston’s mayor attempted 
to arrange an agreement between the GSA and Historic Charleston Foundation, the GSA 
finally backed down from its plans.  However, just down the street, remodeling was 
performed on another building for which the easement holder only held an easement on 
three of the walls.109 
                                                 
107 See Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (D.C. 1997); Bagley v. 
Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994); Found. for the Pres. of Historic 
Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794 (D.C. 1994).  See also  Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An 
Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and Defense of Conservation Easements and Other 
Conservation and Preservation Tools, 78 Denv. U.L. Rev. 373, 399-408 (2001). 
108 See Richard Roddewig, Preservation Easements: Current Issues (prepared for ALI/ABA Historic 
Preservation Law Program in Washington, D.C. Apr. 29-30, 2004) (describing other benefits such as that 
easements contain no economic hardship exemption). 
109 Robert Behre, Federal ‘Facadism’ Plans Razed, THE POST & COURIER, Jan. 7, 1999, B1 (quoting 
Charleston’s mayor, “I assume it was that the interior covenants were a barrier to [the GSA] using it as they 
saw fit.”).  Appendix B represents another anecdote of easements’ staying power in the face of 
modification or development pressures.  The two photos are of adjacent properties on the 900 block of F 
Street, N.W.  At left stands the National Union Building, on which the National Trust holds an easement.  
On the right is the façade of the Atlantic Building.  Interview with Paul Edmondson, Vice President and 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Because easements are treated as commodities under § 170(h), a lower value 
would undoubtedly result in a decline in the number of easements that are donated.  A 
realignment between the percentage diminution claimed in income tax deductions and the 
actual, more likely lower, value of easements produces both positive and negative 
effects.110  The negative effect is that there is likely to be a decrease in the number of 
donated easements.  The positive effect is that a realignment stays true to the normative 
reasons for granting a deduction in the first place—that a publicly-funded form of 
compensation, namely a tax expenditure, ought to accurately reflect what someone has 
done to protect the commons. 
Yet there is some “slippage” between this concept of what is normatively 
appropriate and the market value of an easement that a taxpayer is able to deduct because 
the market price cannot perfectly reflect what is beneficial to the commons.  Consider the 
scenario where a comparable sales analys is, or any other valuation method, establishes 
that an easement has no negative effect on a property’s selling price.  In that scenario, the 
owner will be unable to deduct anything for the donation of an easement and therefore 
will be unlikely to donate the easement.  However, although the easement has no value to 
the owner, there is still historic preservation value in the easement because it is perpetual.  
In other words, there is not a perfect match between the burden that an owner suffers via 
                                                                                                                                                 
General Counsel for the National Trust for Historic Preservation in Washington, D.C. (March 29, 2004); E-
mail from Carol Goldman, President, L’Enfant Trust (May 10, 2004, 10:57 EST) (on file with author).  See 
also  In re The Atlantic Building, H.P.A. Nos. 02-261, 02-266 (Aug. 29, 2002) (holding that plan involving 
demolition of building, but retention of façade, was a plan of special merit).   
110 This argument is solely from the viewpoint of historic preservation.  That is to say, it does not speak to 
the contention that a community is better off with a “special merit” exception that does allow for a net 
utility gain to the community even if it comes as a blow to historic preservation.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
1102 (2004). 
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the reduced price that encumbered property commands in the market (i.e. before versus 
after value) and the historic preservation benefits that are derived from the easement. 
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111 The valuation methodology gives the property owner two places in which to articulate that the easement 
goes beyond local regulations.  First, although not required, the owner can show that before imposing the 
easement, the property could have reasonably been put to a higher and better use.  Second, the owner must 
show that the easement has restricted use of the property in a way that goes beyond preexisting local 
ordinances.  Therefore, the disparity in effect between existing regulations and a donated easement is 
starkest in those cases where not only is the owner, post-easement, more restricted in his use of the 
property, but where that owner had not yet put the property to its “highest and best” use prior to the 
easement. 
